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IS IT THE SIREN'S CALL?: JUDGES AND
FREE SPEECH WHILE CASES ARE
PENDING
Erwin Chemerinsky*
"The sirens of mythology pale in comparison to the allure of
seeing yourself on CNN. The results, however, can be about
the same."1
Judge Lance Ito, prior to handling the O.J. Simpson case2
I. INTRODUCTION
In November 1994, Judge Lance Ito, the presiding judge in the
murder trial of O.J. Simpson, granted an exclusive interview to a local
Los Angeles television station.3 The interview was with a local news
anchor, Tritia Toyota, and was shown in five-minute installments on
the 11:00 p.m. news over the course of a week. The interview was
heavily advertised and attracted enormous public attention.
Although the interview focused primarily on Judge Ito and his
background, it did occasionally touch on the Simpson case. In the ini-
tial segment of the interview, Judge Ito described his family back-
ground and spoke of how his parents, Japanese-Americans, were
* Legion Lex Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. I am
very grateful to Cristina Golesorkhi and Julie Hsu for their excellent research assistance.
1. BJ. Palermo, Profile: Lance A. Ito, He Helped Pick Simpson Judge, L.A. DAILY J.,
July 19, 1994, at 1, 5 (quoting Judge Lance A. Ito). The full quote consisted of three cau-
tions Judge Ito offered for judges handling high proffle cases:
"Rule One: Be cautious, be careful, and when in doubt, keep your mouth
shut.
Rule Two: When tempted to say something, take a deep breath and refer to
Rule One.
Rule Three: The sirens of mythology pale in comparison to the allure of
seeing yourself on CNN. The results, however, can be about the same."
Id at 5 (quoting Judge Lance A. Ito).
2. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County June 17, 1994).
3. Lance Ito: Face to Face (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 13-18, 1994). The inter-
views were broadcast by station KCBS-TV. I should disclose that I have frequently served
as a commentator for KCBS during the Simpson case. However, I had no involvement
whatsoever in the interview of Judge Ito. Additionally, it should be noted that the public
criticism of the interview focused on Judge Ito and not on the actions of anchor Tritia
Toyota or KCBS.
832 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
interned during World War II. Pictures of the internment camp, his
parents, and Judge Ito as a child were shown.
In the second part of the interview Judge Ito discussed important
influences in his life. In particular, he mentioned how he had asked an
old mentor, now a retired judge, to serve as special master and handle
the "mystery envelope."4 During the preliminary hearing, the defense
produced an item in an envelope and objected to the disclosure of its
contents to the prosecution or the public. Judge Ito did not, of course,
reveal the contents of the envelope in the interview, but he did de-
scribe his choice of a special master to handle it.
In the third and fourth parts of the interview, Judge Ito discussed
his views of what makes a good judge and ruminated on what it feels
like to be an instant celebrity. Finally, the interview series concluded
with Tritia Toyota speaking to Judge Ito's parents.
Commentators were generally highly critical of Judge Ito for hav-
ing granted the interview. Some objected that Ito was a hypocrite be-
cause he had repeatedly objected to the media frenzy surrounding the
Simpson case but then fueled it by participating in the much-hyped
interview.5 Some argued, more generally, that it is inappropriate for a
judge in a pending case to grant interviews with the press.6
Judge Ito's conduct provides the opportunity.for considering the
broader question: When, if at all, may or should judges handling
pending cases make statements to the press? Although Judge Ito's
interview occurred in the context of a case that has received unprece-
dented media attention, the issue could arise in countless cases in the
future. For many reasons, judicial proceedings are increasingly at-
tracting public attention. During the past few years, in Los Angeles
alone there have been several highly publicized cases: the allegations
of child abuse at the McMartin Preschool, the two trials of the officers
responsible for the beating of Rodney King, the trial of the individuals
involved in beating Reginald Denny, the murder trial of the Menen-
dez brothers, and the trial of alleged Hollywood madam Heidi Fleiss.
This trend of public attention to trials and judicial proceedings is
likely to continue in the future. In part it is based on the public's
4. Andrea Ford & Jim Newton, Prosecutors Zero In on Time of Killings, L.A. TMEs,
July 2, 1994, at Al, A5.
5. Jim Newton & Andrea Ford, Ito's Televised Interview Stirs Controversy, L.A.
TIMEs, Nov. 15, 1994, at Al.
6. Id, at A26.




rediscovery of the inherent drama surrounding court proceedings. In
the era before television, people attended court sessions for entertain-
ment. The enormous success of books by authors such as Scott Throw
and John Grisham reveal, and fuel, the public's interest in the legal
system. Televising court proceedings, now legal in virtually all state
courts, promises to make celebrities of judges in closely watched
cases. There was a time when Judge Wapner from the People's Court
was more famous than any Supreme Court Justice. Now with Court-
TV, judges handling high-profle cases quickly will become familiar to
wide segments of the public. In many instances there will be great
public interest in hearing from the judge handling a pending case.
Thus, the issues raised by Judge Ito's interviews are sure to arise
again and again in the future. In analyzing such judicial behavior,
three questions must be answered. First, under what circumstances do
statements by judges in pending cases violate the code of judicial eth-
ics? Second, even if the statements violate the code of judicial ethics,
are they protected by the First Amendment and, if so, under what
circumstances? Finally, even if the statements are legal, are they de-
sirable; is it a good thing for judges in pending cases to speak to the
press and grant interviews?
This Essay addresses each of these three questions in turn. The
scope of the Essay is limited to discussing the legality and propriety of
statements made by judges in pending cases. My overall conclusion is
that it is both legal and desirable for judges to speak to the press and
that judicial speech about pending cases should be limited only where
it poses a substantial risk of materially prejudicing an adjudicatory
proceeding.
II. Do JUDGES' STATEM-rcs ABOUT PENDING CASES VIOLATE
THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHCS?
In evaluating the conduct of judges, the threshold question is
whether the behavior violates codes of judicial ethics.8 Four provi-
sions of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct are potentially relevant.
Canon 1 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct states: "An in-
dependent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our
society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining and
enforcing high standards of conduct.., so that the integrity and inde-
8. Because my focus is not solely on the Simpson case or even cases in California, I
will consider the relevant provisions of the American Bar Association's Model Code of
Judicial Conduct rather than the provisions of California law regulating judicial behavior.
.April 1995]
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pendence of the judiciary will be preserved." 9 Although Canon 1 is
not a basis for disciplining judges, it does express the general philoso-
phy of the Code.10
Canon 2A states that "[a] judge shall respect and comply with the
law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confi-
dence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."" Again, this
is a general provision and while judges certainly may be disciplined for
violating the law, it is more questionable whether judges can be disci-
plined under the general requirement for promoting confidence in the
judiciary.'2 The standard is obviously vague; it provides little gui-
dance as to which statements are allowed and which are prohibited.' 3
The provision also is overbroad. 4 If a judge exposes serious corrup-
tion in the judicial system, that might undermine public confidence in
the integrity of the judicial system,' 5 but the speech surely would be
constitutionally protected.
The provision most directly on point is Canon 3B(9). It provides:
A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or im-
pending in any court, make any public comment that might
reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its
fairness or make any nonpublic comment that might substan-
tially interfere with a fair trial or hearing. The judge shall
require similar abstention on the part of court personnel sub-
ject to the judge's direction and control. This Section does
not prohibit judges from making public statements in the
course of their official duties or from explaining for public
information the procedures of the court. 6
9. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucr Canon 1 (1990).
10. See, eg., In re Schenck, 870 P.2d 185, 214 (Or.) (Unis, J., specially concurring in
part, dissenting in part) ("Canon 1 is not a rule of conduct under which a judge may be
disciplined. Rather, Canon 1 is the basic philosophical provision of the Code, and its terms
have an important bearing on all the other canons."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 195 (1994).
11. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDucr Canon 2A.
12. One judge has stated that he has "reservations as to whether the standard ex-
pressed in Canon 2A could serve as the basis for discipline for conduct not otherwise pro-
scribed by the Code." Schenck, 870 P.2d at 215 n.1 (Unis, J., specially concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
13. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,108-09 (1972) (articulating rule that
vague laws regulating speech violate First Amendment).
14. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,519-20 (1972) (articulating principle that
overbroad laws regulating speech violate First Amendment).
15. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDUcr Canon 2A.
16. Id. Canon 3B(9).
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Interestingly, the Commentary following the rule is broader in its
restriction of speech than the rule. The Commentary declares: "The
requirement that judges abstain from public comment regarding a
pending or impending proceeding continues during any appellate pro-
cess and until final disposition.
17
Finally, Canon 4 provides that judges are allowed to speak and
write -about the legal system so long as the activities do not undermine
the ability of the judge to appear neutral and impartial. Canon 4
states: "A judge may speak, write, lecture, teach and participate in
other extra-judicial activities concerning the law, the legal system, the
administration of justice and non-legal subjects, subject to the require-
ments of this Code.
1 8
In light of these provisions, when is a judge prohibited from
speaking to the press? These rules do not create a blanket prohibition
on all judicial statements, but rather draw a distinction based on the
content of the speech.19 Four major types of judicial statements dur-
ing pending cases can be identified: (1) statements about the judge's
personal life; (2) statements about the facts or issues in pending cases;
(3) statements about prior cases; and (4) statements about issues of
law generally.
These categories are not completely distinct. For example, a
judge may explain how his or her background has led to views on a
particular issue and that issue might be the core of a pending case.
Similarly, a judge might speak generally about the law, but the appli-
cation of the speech to a pending case could be obvious to all observ-
ers. For example, if Judge Ito had stated to the press his general views
about admitting prior acts of domestic violence in murder trials where
a husband has killed a wife or ex-wife, all would see the connection to
the Simpson case-even if Judge Ito had never mentioned it by name.
Or a judge might discuss a prior case that is factually identical to a
pending case. Still, for the sake of analysis, it is worth considering
each category separately.
1. Statements about the judge's personal life. Statements about a
judge's personal life generally would not violate any provision of the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct. There is a possible argument that all
17. Id. Canon 3B(9) commentary.
18. Id. Canon 4B.
19. Content-based restrictions on speech raise serious First Amendment problems.
See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."). These First Amendment issues
are discussed infra part III.
April 1995]
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public statements by judges undermine the integrity of the judiciary.
This, however, is untenable; a judge's statements might enhance the
public's image of the judge and the bench. There is no basis for a
blanket assumption that all statements by judges, regardless of their
content, are harmful to the public's image of the judiciary. Nor should
judges be subject to discipline simply because statements are contro-
versial or unpopular. As discussed in Part III, such discipline would
raise obvious First Amendment issues.
Judge Ito, for example, spoke at some length about his family
background and his personal life. Frankly, I found the most moving
aspect of the interview to be his description of his parents' experience
in an internment camp during World War II and Judge Ito's explana-
tion of how that influenced his choice of career.
There might be instances in which the judge's statement about his
or her personal life is so clearly related to the pending litigation as to
run afoul of the provision prohibiting comments about pending litiga-
tion. This would require, however, a showing that the particular state-
ment would be understood as being about the pending case and that it
would meet the standard for discipline in a pending case, as discussed
below.
2. Statements about pending cases. Canon 3B(9) prohibits judges
from making statements about pending cases "that might reasonably
be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness."2 0 In fact, it
prohibits judges from making such comments about proceedings
"pending or impending in any court."21 Therefore, under this rule it
would be improper for judges to serve as commentators for the media
on cases pending before other judges if the comments might be
prejudicial.
The current rule is desirable in that it draws a distinction between
comments that "might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or
impair its fairness" and those that are unlikely to affect a pending pro-
ceeding. 2 Judge Ito's statements about using a retired judge to han-
dle the mystery envelope, and his remarks about how it feels to be the
jurist in a high-profile case, were both about a pending case, but they
did not make him seem biased in favor of either side.
The prior version of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct con-
tained a flat prohibition on judges making comments on pending
20. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucr Canon 3B(9).




cases.P The earlier incarnation of the rule stated that "[a] judge
should abstain from public comment about a pending or impending
proceeding in any court."'  The argument for the earlier rule is that a
blanket prohibition of all comments about pending cases is essential
because line-drawing is too risky; once judges are allowed to speak
about pending cases there is an inherent risk that their statements
might be prejudicial. Yet, there is no reason why lines cannot be
drawn here. Although as with any line-drawing there are grey areas,
some statements are likely to be highly prejudicial and others quite
innocuous. The better approach, as embodied in the current rule, is to
limit expression only in instances where restrictions on speech are
necessary.
Several types of statements by judges about pending cases are
likely to be harmful. For example, judges obviously should not dis-
close confidential information that they learn by virtue of their posi-
tion.' Likewise, the rule should be applied to prohibit judges from
making statements to the press that will impair the possibility of hav-
ing a fair trial. The possibility of an impartial jury is certainly reduced
if a judge publicly proclaims a belief in a defendant's guilt.2 6 Also, to
preserve the appearance of justice, the judge should not make any
statements that indicate that the judge has made up his or her mind
about unresolved disputed issues.
3. Statements about past cases. The rules do not prohibit judges
from speaking publicly about prior cases. Nor should there be any
prohibition. Once the case is over, there is no need to restrict speech
to protect either a fair trial or the appearance of justice. When judges
explain their prior rulings they help to explain the law and the deci-
sions to the public. The only limitation is that judges cannot disclose
confidential information that is not a part of the public record of the
case.
It is possible that a past case is factually so closely related to a
pending case that a statement about it will violate the Model Code of
23. The earlier version, adopted in 1972, was superseded by the 1990 version.
24. MODEL CODE OF JuDIcIAL CoNDOcr Canon 3A(6) (1972).
25. See United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir.) (overturning conviction of
judge for disclosing existence of wiretap to suspect in criminal investigation), cert. granted,
115 S. Ct. 571 (1994).
26. See McCullough v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 49 Cal. 3d 186, 199, 776
P.2d 259, 267, 260 Cal. Rptr. 2d 557, 565 (1989) (ordering removal of judge from office for
directing jurors to find defendant guilty).
ApYri 1995]
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Judicial Conduct.27 For instance, the judge might make a statement
about a past case that arises from the same facts as a pending case and
perhaps even involves a co-conspirator. The question would then be
whether the statement could be regarded as being about the pending
case and whether it could "reasonably be expected to affect its out-
come or impair its fairness."'
4. Statements about legal issues generally. Judges are allowed to
write and speak about the law. In fact, Canon 4 provides that "[a]
judge may speak, write, lecture, teach and participate in other extra-
judicial activities concerning the law, the legal system, the administra-
tion of justice and non-legal subjects, subject to the requirements of
this Code. ' '29 This is certainly desirable. Judges have a unique van-
tage point and their voices are likely to carry great weight in debates
about the legal system. Therefore, judges are to be encouraged to
teach, speak, and write about the law.
It is possible, of course, that in some instances statements about
the law will be understood as being about a pending case before the
judge, and it is possible that the statements can be so strong as to
undermine the ability of the judge to appear impartial. However, for
reasons discussed below, I believe that there should be a strong pre-
sumption in favor of encouraging judges to speak about the law. A
statement should be seen as violating the rules only if it is clearly re-
lated to a pending case and would undermine the ability of the judge
to seem impartial in the matter.
As an example, Judge Ito's comments about the criminal justice
system and the qualities of a good judge should be allowed under the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct. These aspects of Judge Ito's re-
marks were not about the Simpson case and would not cause the pub-
lic to doubt Ito's impartiality.
It is especially problematic to view judges as biased based on
their statements about legal issues. Judges express views about legal
issues in their opinions, and the fact that a judge has an opinion on a
point of law obviously does not preclude the judge from hearing other
cases that present the same legal question. For example, Justice Scalia
repeatedly has expressed his view that Roe v. Wade should be over-
27. I intentionally limit this to factual similarity. As to similarity of legal issues, as
argued below, the fact that a judge has expressed a view as to a legal issue is not a basis for
disqualifying the judge. For example, the fact that the judge has written an opinion on a
topic does not preclude the judge from sitting in a future case even though the judge has
expressed a view on a disputed legal question.
28. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucr Canon 3B(9) (1990).
29. Id Canon 4B.
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ruled." Yet, no one suggests that this disqualifies him from sitting on
future abortion cases even though his views are well known and his
vote is a virtual certainty. Generally, statements about legal issues by
a judge should not be a basis for discipline or disqualification of the
judge.
In sum, when analyzing the Model Code of Judicial Conduct it is
important to distinguish among types of judicial speech. The rules
limit expression only if the speech concerns a pending case and only if
the speech poses a threat to the fair administration of justice.31
Relatively few cases deal with disciplining judges for statements
to the press. By far the vast majority of cases concerning judicial dis-
cipline for speech have discussed the types of speech allowed during
election campaigns.32 In two recent cases, however, judges were disci-
plined for speech about pending cases. In re Schenck concerned a
judge who wrote a letter to the editor and a guest editorial in a news-
paper defending his handling of a case and criticizing the district attor-
ney's ability to handle criminal cases.33 The judge defended his
decisions as "tough and reasonable" and said that "[p]erhaps the
county court.., needs to investigate what alternatives might be avail-
able to ensure the county has a vigorous, competent prosecutor."
34
Oregon follows the earlier version of the Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct that prohibits all speech by judges concerning pending cases, and
the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the judge's suspension without pay
for a period of forty-five days for violating this rule.3"
30. See, eg., Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2873-85 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490, 532-37 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
31. See Leonard E. Gross, Judicial Speech. Discipline and the First Amendment, 36
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1181 (1986) (judges not prohibited from making out-of-court state-
ments as long as statements do not involve pending or impending proceedings).
32. See, e.g., Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing that restriction on campaign speech by judges violates First Amendment); Stretton v.
Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991) (narrowly construing restriction on judicial
candidate's speech so as not to violate Constitution); ACLU v. Florida Bar, 744 F. Supp.
1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990) (granting preliminary injunction against law restricting speech of
judicial candidates); Berger v. Supreme Court, 598 F. Supp. 69 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (uphold-
ing restrictions on speech of judicial candidates), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1108 (1989); see also
Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionality and Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign
Speech by Candidates for Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. REv. 207 (1987) (arguing proscrip-
tion of campaign speech by judicial candidates violates First Amendment and reduces par-
ticipation of voting public).
33. 870 P.2d 185 (Or.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 195 (1994).
34. Ia at 200.
35. Id. at 210.
A.prf 1995]
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The other case, Scott v. Flowers, involved an elected justice of the
peace who wrote an "open letter" to county officials about a problem
in the appellate courts of his county.36 Specifically, the judge com-
plained that the majority of defendants who appealed traffic offense
convictions had the charges dismissed or the fines substantially re-
duced.37 The Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly repri-
manded the judge, but the United States Court of Appeals reversed
the conviction on First Amendment grounds.38
Putting aside the First Amendment issues that are discussed in
Part III of this Essay, it is questionable whether the judges' speech in
either case should have been the subject of discipline. Technically, the
speech in both cases concerned pending cases. In Schenck, the judge
criticized the prosecutor who was involved in pending cases before the
judge;39 in Scott, the judge's comments applied to cases then on
appeal.4" But in neither case was there any indication that the judge's
speech undermined the appearance of fairness or impartiality. There
is no reason to believe that the statements in either case "might rea-
sonably [have been] expected to affect its outcome or impair its fair-
ness."41 In both instances the speech concerned important issues of
public concern: the competence of the district attorney's office and
the conduct of the appellate courts. Thus, punishing such speech
raises major First Amendment questions.
III. ARE A JUDGE'S STATEMENTS ABOUT A PENDING CASE
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT?
Assuming that the Model Code of Judicial Conduct is violated by
a judge's speech, under what circumstances is such expression pro-
tected by the First Amendment? For example, if hypothetically Judge
Ito was disciplined for his discussion of the Simpson case during the
interview with KCBS, would the Constitution provide a successful ba-
sis for challenging the punishment?
In analyzing the First Amendment protection for judicial speech,
the initial question must concern the constitutional standard to be ap-
plied. Three possible constitutional standards might be identified.
One possibility would be to argue that the restrictions of judicial
36. 910 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1990).
37. Id. at 203-04.
38. I& at 204, 212-13.
39. See Schenck, 870 P.2d at 200.
40. See Scott, 910 F.2d at 203-04.
41. MODEL CODE OF JuDIcL CoNDucr Canon 3B(9) (1990).
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speech must meet strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court repeatedly has
held that government restrictions of speech based on the content of its
message will be allowed only if strict scrutiny is met. For example, in
Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, the Supreme Court declared that
"[g]overnment action that~stifles speech on account of its message, or
that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the
Government, contravenes this essential [First Amendment] right."'4 2
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, noted: "For these reasons, the
First Amendment, subject only to narrow and well-understood excep-
tions, does not countenance governmental control over the content of
messages expressed by private individuals.
'4 3
The restriction on judges' speech about pending cases is clearly a
content-based restriction. Judges are free to speak about almost any-
thing so long as the content of the speech is not about the pending
case. An analogy can be drawn to the Supreme Court's decision in
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board." In
that case New York adopted a law prohibiting crime perpetrators
from profiting by selling their stories to the media. The Supreme
Court held this unconstitutional as an impermissible content-based re-
striction of speech, because the criminals could sell any story except
those describing their crimes.' Likewise, under current rules, judges
may speak about anything except pending cases. Under this ap-
proach, the restriction of judicial speech about pending cases would be
allowed only if strict scrutiny is met.
A second possible standard would be to apply the First Amend-
ment rules concerning the speech of government employees.46 After
all, judges are government employees and there is a well-established
body of law concerning when the government may discipline its em-
ployees for their speech activities. The Supreme Court has held that
the First Amendment protects speech by government employees if the
speech addresses a matter of public concern and if the employee's in-
terest in speech is not outweighed by the government's interest in
efficiency.4 7
42. 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2458 (1994).
43. Id. (citations omitted).
44. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
45. I& at 508-09.
46. The Fifth Circuit followed this approach in Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.
1990).
47. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
April 1995]
842 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Under this approach, the initial issue would be whether a judge's
speech addresses a matter of public concern. Almost certainly this
requirement would be met if the speech pertained to a pending case.
Then the question would be whether the government's interest in effi-
ciency outweighed the benefits of the speech. The objection, however,
to a judge's speech about pending cases is not that it interferes with
the efficient operation of the courts, but that the speech undermines
the judge's appearance of fairness and impartiality. Thus, in applying
the standard concerning government employees' speech to judges, the
question would be whether the harms to the integrity of the courts are
outweighed by the public benefits of the speech.
The final possible approach would be to analogize to the stan-
dards used in regulating attorneys' speech. In Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada, the Supreme Court concluded that a state constitutionally
may punish a lawyer's speech if the expression creates a "substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing [an adjudicatory] proceeding. '48
The Court explained that attorneys do not give up their First Amend-
ment rights when they receive a license to practice law. Indeed, Jus-
tice Kennedy explained that "[t]o the extent the press and public rely
upon attorneys for information because attorneys are well informed,
this may prove the value to the public of speech by members of the
bar."49 The Court noted, however, that as officers of the court, law-
yers' speech is congtitutionally subject to greater restrictions than
would be allowed in other circumstances.50 The Court found that the
First Amendment allows attorneys to be disciplined for speech that
creates a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudica-
tory proceeding.51
An argument can be made for any of these approaches.
Although they differ in phrasing and emphasis, I question how much
they actually differ in application. The government has a compelling
interest in preventing judicial speech that poses a substantial likeli-
hood of materially prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. Likewise,
if there is a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudi-
catory proceeding, then a court is likely to conclude that the govern-
ment's interest outweighs the value of the speech. Thus, there is a
strong argument that the best approach would be to apply the Gentile
standard when evaluating the constitutional protection for judicial
48. 501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991).
49. Id. at 1056-57 (Kennedy, J., concurring).




speech. Besides, there is a logic to holding attorneys and judges to the
same standard.
Some might object that the Gentile standard is not sufficiently
protective of speech, that strict scrutiny should be used. Yet, again, a
court is likely to find that strict scrutiny is met and a judge may be
punished for speech that risks substantial prejudice to an adjudicatory
proceeding. Furthermore, courts are unlikely to find that judges are
entitled to more constitutional protection for their speech than are all
other government employees or than attorneys.
In fact, the current provision in the Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct states a standard that is quite similar to Gentile and specific to
judges' speech. As discussed in Part II, it provides that judges are
prohibited from speaking about a pending case only if the "public
comment... might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or
impair its fairness."52 Under any of the First Amendment standards
described above, this rule probably is constitutional. The rule meets
strict scrutiny because there is a compelling interest in preventing ju-
dicial speech that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome
or fairness of pending proceedings. The rule meets the standard for
restricting government employees' speech because the government's
interest in restricting such expression outweighs the judge's interest in
making such comments.
Finally, the standard is very similar to the Gentile rule except in
one respect. Gentile requires that there be a "substantial likelihood"
that an attorney's speech would cause harm;53 the Model Code of Ju-
dicial Conduct requires only that it "might reasonably be expected"
that harm would occur.5 4 I believe that the Gentile rule is preferable
because it requires more likelihood of harm before speech is prohib-
ited and subject to discipline. Yet, as a constitutional matter, the state
almost surely would be regarded as having a compelling interest in
prohibiting statements by judges that might reasonably be expected to
affect the outcome or the fairness of a pending proceeding.
Under either the Gentile standard or the phrasing of the current
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, all of Judge Ito's comments in the
interview with KCBS were protected by the First Amendment. His
comments about the Simpson case were general and did not express
any views about disputed issues or evidence. Nothing he said caused a
substantial likelihood of prejudicing the adjudicatory proceeding or
52. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDuCF Canon 3B(9) (1990).
53. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1076.
54. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucr Canon 3B(9) (1990).
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could reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or the fairness of
the case.
Similarly, the speech in both of the cases discussed earlier-In re
Schenck 55 and Scott v. Flowers56-should have been regarded as con-
stitutionally protected. Both involved issues of public importance and
in neither instance was there any indication that the speech would
jeopardize a fair trial.
57
This is not to say that judges can never be punished for speech
about pending cases. For instance, a judge could be disciplined for
making comments that might prejudice the jury in a pending case. If a
judge publicly declared his or her belief in a defendant's guilt prior to
the jury's verdict, there almost certainly could be a finding of materi-
ally prejudicing the adjudicatory proceeding.
In sum, judicial speech, even about pending cases, should be re-
garded as constitutionally protected unless the government can prove
that the speech posed a substantial likelihood of materially prejudic-
ing an adjudicatory proceeding, or at the very least, prove that the
statement might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or im-
pair its fairness. Under this standard the prior version of the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct was overbroad because it prohibited judicial
speech about pending cases even in situations where the restriction
was unnecessary to protect a fair trial. The current version, which is
more limited in scope, is constitutional.
IV. Is IT DESIRABLE FOR JUDGES TO SPEAK ABOUT PENDING
CASES?
Even if a judge's speech does not violate the code of judicial eth-
ics and even if it is protected by the First Amendment, that does not
mean that the speech is desirable. For example, though most would
agree that Judge Ito's interview did not violate the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct and that, in any event, the speech is constitutionally
protected, there is still the question of whether it was desirable for
him to do the interview.
There are three main benefits when judges speak publicly while
cases are pending. One is educating the public. When a judge ex-
plains aspects of a case or the legal system there is an enormous bene-
55. 870 P.2d 185 (Or.), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 195 (1994).
56. 910 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1990).
57. In Scott, the Fifth Circuit found that the judge's speech was protected by the First
Amendment, id. at 203, but in Schenck, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected the claim of
constitutional protection for the speech, 870 P.2d at 205.
[Vol. 28:831
THE SIREN'S CALL?
fit in informing the public. For example, I believe that more people
will learn about the law and the legal system from the Simpson case
than any other single event in American history.
A contrary response might be that anything said by the judge
could be communicated by others making judicial speech unnecessary.
However, judges by virtue of their position and experience may offer
perspectives that others cannot. Besides, a judge's comments-espe-
cially in a high-profile pending case-might receive greater public at-
tention and a larger audience than another commentator.
Additionally, under the First Amendment, it is never a justification to
restrict one person's speech because someone else could express the
same message.
A second benefit to having judges speak about pending cases is
more subtle and therefore more often overlooked: It helps people to
see judges as human beings. With rare exceptions, people know little
about occupants of state and federal benches. This ignorance is espe-
cially ironic and sad when it comes to state court judges because in
almost all states voters elect or review these judges at the polls.
The courtroom setting, with a black-robed judge sitting on a
raised bench, makes judges seem more godlike than human. The in-
terview with Judge Ito allowed people to see him as a person with a
family, a cultural background, and human interests. The pictures of
his childhood made it easier for people to view him not as an oracle of
the law, but as a person.
The response to this might be that it is undesirable to humanize
judges; that judicialrulings will carry more credibility if judges remain
anonymous oracles of the law. Although I doubt that this is true, even
if it were, I think that it is undesirable. If people see judges as human
beings, they will have a better understanding of the legal system. Peo-
ple will better appreciate that the identity of the judge matters and
will take more seriously the selection of judges at both the federal and
state levels. They will be more likely to realize that when they hear of
a court ruling it need not be accepted as an inevitable decision from
on high, but a conclusion of a human being that can be discussed and
criticized as such.
A third benefit of judges speaking to the media is that it might
enhance the image of the bench, the courts, and maybe even govern-
ment generally. A positive performance by a judge can improve the
credibility of the judiciary. For example, the interview with Judge Ito
showed him to be articulate and thoughtful. His moving description
of his parents' experience in an internment camp helped explain his
Apri 19951
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decision to become a judge and his commitment to fairness. This can
only enhance the credibility of his rulings and, more generally, en-
hance the image of the judiciary.
The response to this is to argue that interviews with judges
might degrade the image of the bench and hurt the credibility of the
judiciary. Judges might appear negatively in the media. Perhaps a
particular judge will come off as incompetent, as autocratic, or as vain.
Many reacted to the interview with Judge Ito in a different manner
than I did. Many saw his television interview as egotistical and
inappropriate.58
Ultimately, there is no inherent reason why interviews with
judges will do more to enhance the image of the judiciary than they
will do to harm the judiciary. Some statements by judges in pending
cases might have a positive effect, some might have a negative effect.
Several arguments might be made against judges making state-
ments about pending cases. One argument is that judges should dis-
courage publicity about pending matters so as to enhance the
likelihood of a fair trial and that judges only fuel publicity when they
grant interviews. For example, Judge Ito was criticized as being a hyp-
ocrite for the interview with KCBS after months of attacking the press
coverage of the case.
I disagree with both the premise of this argument and its applica-
tion to Judge Ito. I do not believe that publicity about pending cases
is to be avoided or that media coverage is inherently a threat to a
defendant's right to a fair trial. In general, media scrutiny of a case
promotes a fair trial because participants will take greater care since
injustices can be exposed. A star-chamber proceeding 9 is the antithe-
sis of a fair trial.
Moreover, there is little support for the proposition that even ex-
tensive media coverage prevents a fair trial. As the Supreme Court
explained: "Empirical research suggests that in the few instances
when jurors have been exposed to extensive and prejudicial publicity,
they are able to disregard it and base their verdict upon the evidence
presented in court. ' 60 Additionally, much of the argument for re-
58. See, e.g., Robert C. Felimeth, Just Another Nice Guy? Phooeyl, L.A. TIMEs, Nov.
16, 1994, at B7.
59. The star chamber was an ancient English criminal court which proceeded inquisito-
rially. See G.R.Y. RADCLIFF & GEOFFR Y CRoss, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 106-07
(GI. Hand & D.J. Bentley eds., 6th ed. 1977).
60. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030,1054-55 (1991) (citing Rita J. Simon,
Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the
Impact on Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REv. 515 (1977)); Robert E. Dreschel,
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stricting pretrial publicity is based on the false assumption that jurors
are tainted if they have heard anything about a case before the trial.
A fair trial does not require ignorant jurors, but rather jurors who can
be trusted to decide based on the evidence presented in the court-
room. As the Supreme Court has recognized, intensive voir dire-
questioning of prospective jurors about what they have heard and
what they think-is a key element of assuring a fair trial.61
Some of the criticism directed at Judge Ito for being a hypocrite
was unfair. Much of Judge Ito's criticism of the media was for irre-
sponsible reporting. For instance, his greatest outrage was directed at
a local television reporter for falsely reporting that DNA testing
linked blood on socks found at O.J. Simpson's home to Nicole Brown
Simpson. 2
Yet, it also is true that Judge Ito more generally objected to the
media circus surrounding the Simpson case and in this way his inter-
view with KCBS seemed curious, if not hypocritical. At times, Judge
Ito did seem to be engaged in a battle with the press, disparaging the
media, sending letters to media executives trying to control their sto-
ries,63 and even at one point barring the media from the courtroom
during jury selection. I believe that Judge Ito's error was in these at-
tacks on the media and not in granting the interview with KCBS.
Judge Ito, at times, seemed almost obsessed with trying to control
press coverage of the case; something that judges cannot and should
not try to do.
A second objection to judges speaking about pending cases is that
it diverts attention from the case and focuses it on the judge. Robert
Fellmeth wrote of Judge Ito:
The problem is that the neutrality of a judge, in reality or
public perception, may be influenced by more than financial
reward; for many, the notoriety outweighs all other
inducements.
All along, the judge has confined his public appearances
to the courtroom. Now he enters the spotlight to talk about
An Alternative View of Media-Judiciary Relations: What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests
About the Fair Trial-Free Press Issue, 18 HOFSTRA L. Rnv. 1 (1989).
61. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1055 ("Voir dire can play an important role in reminding jurors
to set aside out-of-court information and to decide the case based upon the evidence
presented at trial.").
62. Andrea Ford & Greg Braxton, Ito to Rule on TV Use in Courtroom, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 1994, at B1, B8.
63. Judge Ito sent letters to three media executives asking them not to air interviews
with Faye Resnick until after the jury was sequestered.
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his past, his values, his dreams. Hey, I don't want to hear
that stuff. I want a neutral and detached arbiter who refuses
to buy into the media extravaganza. I want someone who
does not allow even the perception that media attention may
be an influence.64
This is a powerful argument, but I do not believe that it out-
weighs the benefits of judges in pending cases speaking to the press
and granting interviews. If the interview educates people about the
law and if it helps people to see judges as human beings, then it is
desirable even if some might see the judge's behavior as an egotistical
act. The fact that a judge gives an interview should not keep the jurist
from being perceived as neutral and impartial. Nor should the fact
that the judge agrees to an interview justify a conclusion that the
judge's decisions will be influenced by media attention.
V. CONCLUSION
The intense public controversy over Judge Ito's interview with
KCBS made it seem that it was unique and unheard of for a judge to
speak with the press. Such is not at all the case. The Los Angeles
Daily Journal, a newspaper covering the legal system, regularly
profiles judges and frequently quotes them. During the bicentennial
celebration of the Constitution, Justice Harry Blackmun was inter-
viewed by the television show Superior Court.65 The interviews,
which were shown over a week, revealed a self-effacing, highly intelli-
gent man. Last year, while he was still on the Court, Justice Blackmun
was interviewed by Nightline where he spoke of issues such as the
death penalty and abortion.66 In fact, Judge Ito was interviewed ear-
lier in the Simpson case by several newspaper reporters 67 and no one
objected.
There are many reasons why a judge decides to talk to the press.
Perhaps the judge wishes to criticize an aspect of the legal system and
call for reform. Perhaps the judge wants to clarify a matter about
which there is confusion. Perhaps the judge sees a unique opportunity
64. Fellmeth, supra note 58, at B7.
65. Marjorie Williams, On "Superior Court". A Brief Word from Justice Blackmun,
WASH. PosT, Feb. 9,1987, at A9; Morning Report: TV & Video, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1987,
pt. VI (Calendar), at 2.
66. Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 5, 1994).
67. See Palermo, supra note 1; Henry Weinstein, Ito Readies Himself for Glare of Me-
dia Spotlight, L.A. Tnvms, July 23, 1994, at Al.
[Vol. 28:831
April 1995] THE SIREN'S CALL? 849
to educate the public. Perhaps, at times, it is simply a matter of ego
and the judge enjoying the media attention.
Whatever the reason why a judge speaks during a pending case,
the speech is allowed so long as it does not seriously risk undermining
the fairness of the proceedings. Under both the Model Code of Judi-
cial Conduct and the First Amendment, judges can speak unless there
is a real threat that the comments will materially prejudice the case.
Hopefully speech by judges will enlighten and educate the public or,
at the very least, allow the public to see judges in a more human light.
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